

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02920 01 OF 02 272103Z

60

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07 IO-14 OMB-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 DRC-01

/148 W

----- 053856

P 271945Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5924

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2920

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: MAY 24 SPC DISCUSSION OF DATA

REF: A) USNATO 2841 B) STATE 108719 C) USNATO 2845

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

SUMMARY. IN ABSENCE OF AN AGREED WG DATA REPORT, SPC MAY 24 HELD FURTHER GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT, WITH UK, DENMARK, FRG AND NETHERLANDS OPPOSING ANY DECISION TO TRANSMIT REVISED FIGURES TO AHG FOR USE IN NEGOTIATIONS. BELGIUM SAID DATA WAS NEEDED FOR TACTICAL NEGOTIATING REASONS, AND WAS ONLY ALLY TO ARGUE FOR SENDING DATA TO AHG. US PROPOSED THAT AT LEAST ALLIED NGA AGGREGATE TOGETHER WITH COUNTRY BREAKDOWNS SENT TO VIENNA FOR USE WHEN DEEMED USEFUL IN NEGOTIATIONS. SPC RETURNS TO SUBJECT MAY 29. ACTION REQUESTED:
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02920 01 OF 02 272103Z

WASHINGTON APPROVAL OF AMENDMENTS CABLED REF A TO WG DATA PACKAGE, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AGREED WG REPORT IN TIME FOR MAY 29 SPC MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. HAMPERED AGAIN BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF AGREED WG DATA REPORT, CHAIRMAN ASKED WHETHER ALLIES WISHED TO MAKE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ON QUESTION. US REP DREW FULLY ON REF B GUIDANCE, WHICH PROMPTED SERIES OF LENGTHY INSTRUCTED COMMENTS, FROM DANISH, UK, FRG AND DUTCH REPS, ALL OF WHOM FOR VARIETY OF REASONS OPPOSED TRANSMITTING AT

THIS TIME REVISED FIGURES TO AHG FOR USE IN NEGOTIATIONS.

2. DANISH REP (VILLADSEN) SAID ALLIES SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO PUT UPDATED FIGURES FORWARD IN NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THEY WERE SURE DATA WERE ACCURATE AND COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS CONSISTENT. MEANING OF RECENT UPDATE EXERCISE WAS TO REVIEW CRITERIA OF CALCULATION, AS WELL AS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DIFFERENT TIMES ON WHICH CALCULATIONS BASED. HE WONDERED WHETHER ALLIES HAD CONSIDERED AND EXPLAINED THIS PROBLEM ADEQUATELY. ALLIES SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF AGREEING TO AND THEN PUTTING FORWARD HIGHER FIGURES, AND SHOULD PROBABLY ASK WG FOR ITS EVALUATION. IN VIEW OF FOREGOING, DENMARK FELT ALLIES SHOULD GIVE AHG NEW AIR MANPOWER FIGURES, BUT SHOULD NOT CHANGE GROUND

FIGURES. IT WAS UNWISE TO CHANGE FIGURES NOW IN VIEW OF ACKNOWLEDGED GAPS AND UNCERTAIN COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS, ALTHOUGH ALLIES COULD DECIDE TO DO SO LATER IF MILITARY OR TACTICAL NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS MADE THIS ADVISABLE.

3. UK REP (LOGAN) SAID HE HAD LISTENED CAREFULLY TO DANISH PROPOSAL TO GIVE AHG NEW AIR MANPOWER FIGURES BUT NOT NEW GROUND DATA. THIS APPROACH WOULD NOT MEET ALLIED NEEDS. IN UK DEL VIENNA'S JUDGEMENT, ALLIES SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES PROBLEM, RATHER THAN FIGURES THEMSELVES. DATA QUESTION WAS LESS IMPORTANT AT THIS TIME SINCE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN NO DISPOSITION THUS FAR TO DISCUSS IT; ON THE OTHER HAND THEY SHOULD BE INDUCED TO RESPOND TO THE GROUND FORCE DEFINITION ALLIES HAD PUT FORWARD AT THE APRIL 8 INFORMAL SESSION. IN LONDON'S VIEW, ALLIES SHOULD CONCENTRATE INTERNALLY ON SOLVING OF ISSUES AND DILEMMAS WHICH PERSIST IN DATA PACKAGE DEVELOPED THUS FAR. ON ALLIED SIDE,
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02920 01 OF 02 272103Z

LONDON BELIEVED ACTUAL RATHER THAN AUTHORIZED FORCES SHOULD BE COUNTED. DUTCH SHORT LEAVE PERSONNEL SHOULD THEREFORE BE EXCLUDED. IF ACTUAL FORCES ARE COUNTED THEN PROBLEM OF HOW TO EXPLAIN NORMAL AND INEVITABLE FLUCTUATIONS OVER TIME MUST BE ADDRESSED. PERHAPS A MARGIN SHOULD BE BUILT INTO THE COUNT WHICH COULD THEN BE EXPLAINED TO SOVIETS. ON PACT SIDE, TOTAL AGREED GROUND MANPOWER FIGURE WILL DEPEND ON HOW CERTAIN AIR DEFENSE UNITS ARE COUNTED. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS, IN UK VIEW, TO PUT FORWARD NEW FIGURES UNTIL ALLIES HAD WORKED OUT COUNTING ANOMALIES. THEY SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER IMPLICATIONS OF INTRODUCING AIR MANPOWER FIGURES IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECT ON THE PROPOSED COMMON CEILING FIGURE OF 700,000. IN VIEW OF THESE CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES, UK THEREFORE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT AN INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED AT THE

EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. FINALLY, THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE UP A CAREFUL EVALUATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH MOVING TO NEW FIGURES WOULD ENTAIL, AND THE UK THEREFORE BELIEVED THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY TO MEET THE AHG'S MAY 30 DEADLINE FOR DATA.

4. DUTCH REP (SIZOO) SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS CONFORMED TO DANISH AND UK THINKING, AND THAT THE HAGUE WAS OPPOSED TO RELEASING ANY FIGURES TO THE EAST AT THIS TIME. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE UK POSITION FAVORING EXCLUSION OF DUTCH SHORT LEAVE PERSONNEL. FRG REP (HOFSTETTER) SAID BONN AGREED WITH PREVIOUS SPEAKERS AND DID NOT CONSIDER IT SUITABLE TO INTRODUCE REVISED FIGURES AT THIS TIME. FRG BELIEVED THAT ALL OUTSTANDING GAPS IN ANNEX B OF WG DATA PACKAGE SHOULD BE COMPLETED AND HARMONIZED BEFORE NEW FIGURES WERE PUT FORWARD. AS A RESULT, HE SUPPORTED UK PROPOSAL FOR AN INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE, WHICH HOWEVER SHOULD ONLY HAVE A MANDATE TO FILL OUT EXISTING GAPS AND NOT CHANGE NATO AGREED FIGURES. CANADIAN REP (ROY) SAID HE COULD JOIN ANY CONSENSUS REGARDING DATA QUESTION.

5. US REP SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES AT LEAST SEEK TO MOVE FORWARD ON AGREED FIGURES, OF WHICH THERE WERE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER, AND DEFER PROBLEM OF HOW TO HANDLE GAPS UNTIL AHG HAD REACHED A CONCLUSION AS TO WHETHER FURTHER INFORMATION WAS NEEDED. PRIMARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON USE OF DATA AS BARGAINING COUNTERS. AIM HERE WAS FOR ALLIES TO ENGAGE SOVIETS IN A SPECIFIC DIALOGUE ON THE FORCE STRUCTURE ON BOTH SIDES, AND THEREBY MOVE THEM INTO THE DIRECT QUESTION OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED. UK REP REPLIED THAT LONDON WAS NOT PREPARED TO SEPARATE ALLIANCE FIGURES FROM THE TOTAL DATA PACKAGE.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 02920 01 OF 02 272103Z

THIS WAS BECAUSE OF POSSIBILITY THAT THE PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE COULD COME UP WITH A NEW APPROACH TO COUNTING AIR DEFENSE UNITS. IF THIS HAPPENED ALLIES MIGHT WELL HAVE TO CHANGE THE COUNTING ASSUMPTIONS OF THEIR OWN FORCES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE FUNCTIONAL COMPARABILITY. THIS POSSIBILITY AGAIN ARGUED FOR THE NECESSITY OF ALLIES DEVELOPING CORRECT AND DEFENSIBLE FIGURES BEFORE INTRODUCING ANY SET INTO NEGOTIATIONS. US REP REJOINED THAT US PROPOSAL TO SEND TO AHG AT LEAST AGREED FIGURES HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH DISCUSSING FUNCTIONAL COMPARABILITY, WHICH WAS AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT QUESTION. ALLIES WERE NOT CONTEMPLATING ANY GIVE-AWAY TO SOVIETS THROUGH DATA, ANY BASED ON US APPROACH, ALLIES THROUGH GUIDANCE FROM CAPITALS WOULD CONTINUE TO RETAIN FULL DISCRETION AS TO HOW AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THEY WOULD BE USED.

6. BELGIAN REP SUPPORTED US VIEW THAT AGREED FIGURES--EXCEPT FOR DUTCH SHORT LEAVE PERSONNEL--SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD SINCE ALLIES CAN EXPLAIN THOROUGHLY HOW THEY WERE DEVELOPED IF NECESSARY. HE ADDED THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN CHANGING FIGURES AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, AS LONG AS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE FIGURES SO CHANGED WOULD RESULT FROM CHANGING THE CRITERIA OF COUNT. FRG REP SAID BONN WOULD BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO

GIVE AHG FIGURES WHICH WERE NOT ABSOLUTELY DEFENSIBLE WHEN
SUBJECTED TO COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH SOVIET FORCES. DUTCH REP
CONCLUDED THAT THE HAGUE WOULD ALSO BE
EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO SEPARATE ALLIED FIGURES FROM TOTAL PACKAGE.
NEW FIGURES SHOULD BE BASED ON IDENTICAL CRITERIA FOR BOTH SIDES.
SPC RETURNS TO DATA MAY 29.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02920 02 OF 02 272112Z

60

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07 IO-14 OMB-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 DRC-01

/148 W

----- 053888

P 271945Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5925

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 2920

7. COMMENT: IT IS EVIDENT FROM THIS AND PREVIOUS (SEE REF C)
SPC DISCUSSION OF DATA THAT MANY ALLIES, LEAD LARGELY BY U.K.,
DO NOT SEE ANY TACTICAL NEED FOR ALLIES TO INTRODUCE DATA INTO
NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME. IN THEIR VIEW, MAIN ALLIED REQUIREMENT
FOR THE PRESENT IS TO SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITION OF
THOSE FORCES TO BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS. THEY FURTHER REASON
THAT IN VIEW OF SOVIET INDIFFERENCE TO DISCUSS DATA AT ALL, THERE
IS NO COMPELLING REASON FOR ALLIES TO PROVIDE NEW FIGURES AT THIS
TIME. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT NATO MUST NOT
BE SEEN AS CHANGING ITS DATA FREQUENTLY. THEY FEEL THAT THE CON-
TINUED EXISTENCE OF GAPS AND COUNTING ANOMALIES ON WP SIDE (ESPECIALLY

WITH RESPECT TO THE AIR DEFENSE STRUCTURE) MAY WELL REQUIRE ALLIES
TO CHANGE THEIR OWN FIGURES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A COMPARABLE
BASIS OF COUNTING. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD AGAIN BE HARD TO
EXPLAIN TO PUBLIC OPINION.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02920 02 OF 02 272112Z

8. IN MISSION'S VIEW, WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN:

A. AGREEING TO FIGURES CONTAINED IN WG DATA PACKAGE

B. AGREEING TO TRANSMIT A DATA PACKAGE OFFICIALLY TO AHG (FOR THEIR INTERNAL USE) WHICH REPRESENTS NEW, TECHNICALLY DEFENSIBLE FIGURES

C. AGREEING TO WHATEVER NEW FIGURES AND SUBSETS THEREOF, SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS.

9. IN SEEKING TO MOVE FORWARD ON PROBLEM, WE WILL NEED FIRST TO FINALIZE WG ACTION ON DATA PACKAGE. AT PRESENT WE ARE ONLY NATION RESERVING ON REF A AMENDMENTS. WG APPROVAL WILL PRESENT SPC (HOPEFULLY AT MAY 29 MEETING) WITH AN AGREED SET OF FIGURES WHICH WILL THEN ENABLE US TO ADDRESS ISSUE B ABOVE, AND WHICH WE PROPOSE TO DISCUSS IN COMPLETE ISOLATION FROM ISSUE C. OUR PRINCIPAL EFFORT AT THIS JUNCTURE WILL BE TO OBTAIN REMOVAL OF 7,000 DUTCH SHORT-LEAVE PERSONNEL FROM ALLIED TOTAL. WE WILL ALSO ARGUE THAT AHG MUST HAVE NEW FIGURES AVAILABLE INTERNALLY BECAUSE TOTAL FIGURES THEY ARE CURRENTLY WORKING WITH CANNOT BE BROKEN DOWN ON THE NATO SIDE. SENDING DATA PACKAGE IS ESSENTIAL PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT TO ENABLE AHG TO STAY ABREAST OF EVENTS AND NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS.

10. IF WE CAN OBTAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT TO SENDING DATA PACKAGE OFFICIALLY TO VIENNA, WE WOULD THEN PROPOSE TO ADDRESS QUESTION (NOT NECESSARILY AT THE SAME SPC MEETING) OF WHETHER TACTICAL GUIDELINES FOR ITS USE ARE NECESSARY. OUR OVERALL APPROACH WOULD BE TO PERSUADE ALLIES THAT THE AHG IS IN BEST POSITION TO DETERMINE TIMING AND TYPE OF DATA TO BE INTRODUCED INTO NEGOTIATIONS. ACTUAL INITIATIVES ON RELEASE OF DATA WOULD BE BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS AND AGREEMENT IN AHG. IF ANY ALLY WISHED TO RAISE AN ISSUE ABOUT THE PRECISE CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTRODUCING SPECIFIC NUMERICAL DATA WE COULD SAY THAT ONCE THE AHG HAD REACHED A CONCLUSION ON THE QUESTION IT COULD THEN BE DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROCEDURES. BEYOND THIS, WE WOULD LIKE TO SAY AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE IN ANY TACTICAL GUIDELINES. WE MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, STATE THAT THE ALLIED PURPOSE IN ANY RELEASE OF DATA WOULD
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02920 02 OF 02 272112Z

BE TO DERIVE AS MUCH TACTICAL ADVANTAGE AS POSSIBLE (I.E. BY FORCING SOVIETS TO REVEAL THEIR OWN FIGURES, AND TO CONTINUE TO STEER

DISCUSSION TOWARD A FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS). IF ALLIES AGREE

TO SEND TO AHG NATO'S ESTIMATES ON WP GROUND FORCES, WE WOULD SAY THAT SUCH INFORMATION WOULD ONLY BE USED IN SELECTIVE CASES WHERE

ALLIES BELIEVED IT DESIRABLE TO CHALLENGE WP DATA PUT FORWARD ON THEIR

OWN FORCES, WHICH DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN COUNTING CRITERIA, WERE
DIFFERENT FROM, OR INCOMPATIBLE WITH NATO-AGREED DATA.

11. MISSION WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUPPORTING RATIONALE WHICH
WASHINGTON AND USDEL MBFR MIGHT WISH TO OFFER TO SUPPORT OUR
APPROACH TOWARD OBTAINING ALLIED AGREEMENT ON AUTHORIZING
RELEASE OF FIGURES INTO NEGOTIATIONS. END COMMENT.
RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO02920
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740587/abbryved.tel
Line Count: 282
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) USNATO 2841 B) STATE 108719 C) USNATO 2845
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: MAY 24 SPC DISCUSSION OF DATA
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
VIENNA
THE HAGUE
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005